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by 
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The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Bilski v. 
Kappos, concerning the legal standard for determining patentable 
subject matter under the American Patent Act, is used in this Essay as a 
starting point for a brief review of historical, philosophical, and cultural 
influences on subject matter questions in both patent and copyright law. 
The Essay suggests that patent and copyright law jurisprudence was 
constructed initially by the Court with explicit attention to the 
relationship between these forms of intellectual property law and the roles 
of knowledge in society. Over time, explicit attention to that relationship 
has largely disappeared from the Court’s opinions. The Essay suggests 
that renewing consideration of the idea of a law of knowledge would 
bring some clarity not only to patentable subject matter questions in 
particular but also to much of intellectual property law in general. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The contemporary struggle to define what modern courts, scholars, 
and lawyers call “patentable subject matter” builds on centuries’ worth of 
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politics, culture, philosophy, technology, and legal practice. It is hardly 
surprising that any given decision on the topic by the Supreme Court of 
the United States—in the current instance, Bilski v. Kappos,1 decided in 
2010—should have a decidedly modest ambition and impact. Bilski itself 
likely will be little remembered; none of the opinions in the case 
advances the state of the law significantly. What Bilski does signify is that 
modern anxiety about the proper scope of patent law, and about 
intellectual property generally, has reached a critical point, one where 
the Supreme Court’s intellectual property jurisprudence has so painted 
the Court into a doctrinal corner that escape is virtually impossible—
except by radically rethinking the problem.  
There was a time, decades ago, when intellectual property scholars 
confronted the then-novel technology of computer programming and 
wondered aloud whether some new legal paradigm was needed, beyond 
copyright and patent, to accommodate and balance the interests of 
producers, customers and consumers, re-users, and the public at large.2 
That time passed. No such paradigm emerged. The problem—dealing 
with multiple forms of intellectual property law and policy for what 
appear to be the same subject matter, or no relevant form of intellectual 
property law for that subject matter—has deepened. Today, a related but 
different moment has arrived. The occasion, marked by Bilski, is not a 
new technology but the very absence of technology; it is the idea that 
patterns of living might be constructed in law and practice not merely as 
“algorithm[s],” to borrow a term from an older Supreme Court opinion,3 
but as man-made, virtual yet patentable machines. The modernist 
architect Le Corbusier wrote, “The house is a machine for living in” 
(machine à habiter).4 Decades later, living has itself become a kind of 
machine. That is both the premise and the implication of the plausible 
but terribly odd question framed by contemporary patentable subject 
matter cases: When is a patent available for behaving in a certain way? 
For causing others to behave in a certain way? For causing what can be 
fairly called “nature” to behave in a certain way? May a person obtain a 
patent on a way of organizing the activities of the staff of a restaurant 
kitchen? Strategizing risks in a market? Modifying the frequency, 
amplitude, or duration of an electric current, or signal?  
If there are answers to these questions, they may be legal epicycles, 
finely tuned fixes to the workings of a Ptolemaic system whose basic 
 
1 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
2 See, e.g., Allen Newell, Response, The Models Are Broken, The Models Are Broken!, 
47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1023, 1034–35 (1986); Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell 
D. Kapor & J.H. Reichman, A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer 
Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2310 (1994). 
3 See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972) (ruling that a mathematical 
“algorithm” represented in a computer program did not constitute a patentable 
process).  
4 LE CORBUSIER, TOWARD AN ARCHITECTURE 151 (John Goodman trans., 2007) 
(1923). 
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premises are in doubt. Those answers can be found in patent doctrine 
only using the limited internal tools of patent law itself. Propositions that 
are “abstract” and things that are not “articles of manufacture” may not 
be patented.5 Bilski defines a patentable “process” as a “process”6 or, 
according to one concurrence, as an “art,” which is defined in part as a 
“process.”7 In no sense should any of this be regarded as progress, 
Constitutional or otherwise. 
There is a conceptual problem to be investigated before the 
doctrinal problem can be solved, and the conceptual problem lies in the 
near-total isolation of contemporary patent doctrine from copyright and 
trademark law, despite the shared roots of all three.8 Working toward a 
solution therefore requires returning to the foundations of patent law 
and to themes that blended what we now think of and apply as distinct 
bodies of law in a combined (though not perfectly integrated) 
jurisprudence. In that project, I focus here on ideas of knowledge that 
were fundamental to early thinking about what became intellectual 
property doctrine and that should remain so. I do not suggest that Bilski 
(or any other single case or policy development) counsels abolishing 
patent law and starting over from first principles.9 I do suggest that patent 
law could be strengthened by revisiting and building on its conceptual 
and pragmatic linkages with other intellectual property traditions, all of 
which focused, in the first place, on forms and practices of knowledge. 
Those other intellectual property traditions could be strengthened as 
well. 
I organize the rest of this Essay as follows. Part II very briefly sets out 
key themes represented in the intellectual, cultural, and political 
histories which yielded what is generally regarded as the first modern 
patent law, the English Statute of Monopolies of 162410 and which 
followed that statute, leading up to and shortly beyond what is generally 
regarded as the first modern copyright law, the Statute of Anne of 1710.11 
Part III traces those themes through major milestones in the 
development of subject matter jurisprudence for all of American 
 
5 See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226–27. 
6 Id. at 3225–26 (linking the word “process” in section 101 of the Patent Act to 
the definition of “process” in section 100(b) of the Patent Act). 
7 Id. at 3247 (Stevens, J., concurring) (concluding that patents were historically 
confined to “arts,” for which the statutory term “process” is a synonym). 
8 Cf. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984) 
(noting the “historic kinship” between copyright and patent law but not exploring 
the sources or broader implications of that relationship). 
9 I do not adopt either the method or the conclusion of Justice Stevens’s 
concurrence in Bilski, in which four Justices argued that the statutory term “process” 
can only mean what the non-legal term “art” and the Constitutional phrase “useful 
Arts” meant when the Constitution granted Congress the power to enact patent law. 
See Bilski, 103 S. Ct. at 3247, 3252 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
10 See Statute of Monopolies, 1624, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (Eng.). 
11 See Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). 
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intellectual property law, in an effort to reintroduce some conceptual 
integration to a field that has become increasingly fragmented. Those 
milestones are primarily Supreme Court opinions, though it is necessarily 
and obviously true that the Court has always engaged in an interpretive 
dialogue with Congress. Part IV brings that survey to a close with a re-
reading of the Bilski case itself. Part V suggests a different way forward, 
arguing that the time is right to suspend the search for bright line 
distinctions among patent, copyright, and trademark law based on their 
respective subject matter and instead to consider overlaps and 
differentiation based on social interests in knowledge. 
II. THE EMERGENCE OF KNOWLEDGE LAW 
It is conventional today to think of patent law as dealing in 
knowledge,12 but current usage is misleading. Patents are understood as 
dealing in technical knowledge, or information about how the material 
world works and how that information might be applied to solve material 
problems. That sort of knowledge is self-evidently only one form of 
knowledge, and in historical terms it might not even be considered a 
particularly important—one might say, virtuous—form of knowledge.13 
What I have in mind with the term knowledge, here and below, are the 
many ways in which we know the world around us: ways of seeing and 
understanding, which are necessary to the constitution of state, 
community, and individual citizens within it. By this definition, the arts—
including literature, music, sculpture, and film—are forms of knowledge, 
though in many respects art is quite unlike science as a form of 
knowledge. It might be better argued that performing arts, visual arts, 
musical arts, and literary arts—to use one rough taxonomy—are distinct 
forms of knowledge, as are physics, biology, and chemistry and their 
engineering counterparts—to use an equally rough cousin. But these 
 
12 See, e.g., Kevin Emerson Collins, Semiotics 101: Taking the Printed Matter Doctrine 
Seriously, 85 IND. L.J. 1379, 1384 (2010) (“The disclosure obligations [of the Patent 
Act] require a patent applicant to publicize information in a strong sense—to give 
the public a use privilege in the invention qua knowledge, free of the strings of 
property.”).  
13 Aristotle prioritized knowing (the universal) over making (the specific object) 
as forms of knowledge, and making over practice, or the exercise of judgment. But all 
forms of knowledge—theoria, poiesis, and praxis—were intertwined as an 
understanding of knowledge as virtue. See ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. 
VI (David Ross trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2009). 
 The ancient authority of poets and philosophers and the relatively low status of 
the craftsman may be contrasted with an anecdotal sociology of intellectual property 
law practice that puts patent lawyers at the top of an informal hierarchy, based on the 
technical training required for a person to obtain the right to practice before the 
United States Patent Office. Knowledge of science, in its modern sense, has been a 
reliable path to authority and prestige. According to stereotypes, copyright lawyers 
know art, music, and literature and occupy a middle ground; trademark lawyers know 
advertising and marketing. 
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different levels of abstraction are not mutually exclusive. It is plausible to 
see modern “science” as a form of knowledge at the same time as one 
sees “physics” as another form, any subfield of physics as a third, and so 
on. 
That short, highly abstracted review expresses concerns that are 
typically quite far from contemporary intellectual property practice, yet 
that were front and center in the seventeenth and early eighteenth 
century debates that set the law on its course toward the intellectual 
property doctrines that we see and use today. In this Part, I briefly 
recover three key themes from those debates in an effort to close some of 
that distance: arts and artisanship as distinct technical and philosophical 
frameworks for the production of knowledge; state and society as distinct 
political frameworks for knowledge production; and elite and vernacular 
interests as distinct social and cultural frameworks for knowledge 
production. In each case, the distinction is dynamic rather than static, 
and the lines between what I characterize as technical and philosophical, 
political, and social and cultural frameworks are blurry. What we call 
knowledge itself is in large part a product of these themes, rather than a 
fixture within them. These are themes that operated centuries ago to 
generate patent law—and copyright law, as a complement to patent, and 
even some of trademark law—and themes that are represented, at times 
too faintly, in modern intellectual property law. 
A. Artistic and Artisanal Knowledge 
Contemporary scholarship on the origins of intellectual property law 
often works backward from the concept of the “useful Arts,” which 
appears in the United States Constitution as the context in which 
“[i]nventors” may be granted exclusive rights, that is, patents.14 “Useful 
arts,” traceable to the mechanical arts of the seventeenth century, are 
distinguished from “liberal arts,” the skills appropriate to citizenship in a 
free republic.15 Products and materials relating to the useful arts were 
and are thought suitable for patenting; they involve the development of 
new things from existing universal truths or knowledge.16 Products and 
materials relating to the liberal arts were and are thought suitable for 
copyright; they involve knowledge itself.17 This view borrows from pre-
industrial practice and before, including Aristotle’s distinctions among 
theory, things, and practice, carried through Rome, the Renaissance, and 
into the Scientific Revolution.  
That divide between “useful” and “liberal” arts was closing, however, 
even as the Constitution was being drafted. The divide began to dissipate 
 
14 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
15 See John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 
1166–69, 1173–75 (1999).  
16 See id. at 1143–44. 
17 See id. at 1145. 
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in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries during the birth of modern 
science, as natural philosophers—the predecessors of modern 
scientists—showed that nature itself, as well as scholarship, could be a 
source of knowledge—theoretical knowledge. In the end, for both legal 
and cultural purposes, scholars and scientists alike became “creators”—
those who create the immaterial and material “new”18—and the idea of 
“new” knowledge emerged too. In social terms, this narrative recounts a 
progression from liberal arts as the domain of the scholarly elite, working 
in discursive (text-based) media, toward natural philosophy and then 
science, and a counterpart progression of mechanical arts as the domain 
of the people, working in phenomenal (physical and practical) forms, 
primarily objects, toward craft production. Practitioners of the former 
became artists, a term that intentionally obscures its application to 
“useful arts,” as creators of the new. The latter became artisans. 
Knowledge workers, to borrow a modern phrase, started to work in the 
lab as well as in the study and the monastery. Craft workers retreated to 
the workshop. 
Recent scholarship in the history of science complicates this 
narrative, suggesting the existence of what Pamela Smith characterizes as 
an “artisanal epistemology” that originated in workshops long prior to 
the Scientific Revolution and that was incorporated into new scientific 
practices rather than extinguished by them.19 That complication is 
evoked by subtle ambiguities in patent law, which measures the 
inventiveness of a new machine or process from the perspective of a 
hypothetical construct sometimes referred to as the “skilled artisan”20 and 
at other times as the “Person Having Ordinary Skill in the Art,” or 
PHOSITA.21 What can a mere artisan “know”? The idea of “artisanal 
epistemology,” Smith explains, is that knowledge about the world may be 
achieved through encounters with nature and particularly through bodily 
encounters with nature, not only via scholarly engagement with text.22 
Bakers, painters, and locksmiths, artisans of their era, were medieval 
knowledge workers, too. 
The point is not only that medieval artisans implicitly (and at times 
explicitly) developed a philosophy underlying their work to justify its 
virtue, but also that artisanal virtue was directly traced forward to ideas 
about knowledge. Smith describes and illuminates the path that ran 
between medieval artisans and their forms of knowledge, on the one 
 
18 See DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE CREATORS: A HISTORY OF HEROES OF THE 
IMAGINATION 524–27 (1992). 
19 See PAMELA H. SMITH, THE BODY OF THE ARTISAN: ART AND EXPERIENCE IN THE 
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 59–85 (2004). 
20 E.g., Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
21 See id. (treating the “skilled artisan” and the “person of ordinary skill in the art” 
as synonyms). The term PHOSITA comes from the Patent Act. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) 
(2006). 
22 SMITH, supra note 19, at 59. 
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hand, and natural philosophers and modern scientists, on the other. The 
latter inherited from the former their hands-on knowledge of nature and 
natural materials and the belief that knowledge of the world was rooted 
in matter.23 Knowledge through practice, as artisanal epistemology, led to 
and justified knowledge through experiment in the hands of natural 
philosophers.24 Smith argues that this sequence occurred not only at the 
level of rhetoric and argument, but in person, among painters, engravers, 
physicians, alchemists, and early scientists—note the crossing of the 
boundaries of social hierarchies—borrowing artisans’ active knowledge.25 
Given that background, it is hardly surprising—but should be 
remembered, as Adrian Johns demonstrates in a recent book—that 
English patent law, as the precursor to American patent law, emerged 
more or less concurrently with the emergence of what we now know as 
copyright law, and that both occurred against a background of emerging 
understandings of the relationships among text, machine, and the 
related ideas of identity and novelty.26 The epistemological challenge 
posed by natural philosophy, given inherited Aristotelian traditions 
(represented by the liberal arts as the highest forms of knowledge) and 
the contrasting artisanal approach, was how to comprehend the related 
but possibly distinct relationships between law and text, as the context for 
copyright and literary property;27 and law and machine and matter, as 
contexts for patent.28 Johns shows how what Smith termed “artisanal 
epistemology” was deployed in the service of arguments by London’s 
booksellers, who were trying to distinguish patent law from literary 
property, and, in so doing, were trying to save a perpetual common law 
right from preemption by statutory copyright.29 The arguments about 
artisanal knowledge—knowledge that leads directly to modern patent law 
sensibility—came to a head in the leading copyright case of Donaldson v. 
Becket.30 One who copied a machine, it was argued, employed powers of 
the mind, because the nature of manufacturing dictated artisanal 
variation from one iteration of the machine to the next.31 One who 
 
23 See id. at 92–93. 
24 See id. 
25 See id. at 59–60. 
26 See ADRIAN JOHNS, PIRACY: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WARS FROM GUTENBERG 
TO GATES 140 (2009). 
27 These being two different things, in the seventeenth century. See id. at 38–39.  
28 See id. at 20–21. 
29 See id. at 28–29. 
30 (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 257, 257–58 (K.B.). 
31  One machine was always slightly different than another, but a book offered a 
different case. The material identity of a book was not the point; what mattered was 
“identity” of the author’s intangible “[s]tyle and sentiment.” Tonson v. Collins, 
(1761) 96 Eng. Rep. 180, 180, 189 (K.B.). Blackstone, arguing for the plaintiff in 
Tonson v. Collins, put the case as follows: “Style and sentiment are the essentials of a 
literary composition. These alone constitute its identity. The paper and print are 
merely accidents, which serve as vehicles to convey that style and sentiment to a 
distance. Every duplicate therefore of a work, whether ten or ten thousand, if it 
Do Not Delete 2/17/2011  6:47 PM 
78 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:1 
copied a book engaged in an act of mechanical reproduction. The 
arguably “higher” nature of intellectual engagement in the former 
justified treating patent as a form of limited statutory right, or privilege, 
because of the importance to public welfare and social progress of 
permitting acts of independent creation. That would preserve literary 
property as a bulwark against mere piracy, as a right distinct from the 
limits imposed by the Statute of Anne.32 The House of Lords rejected the 
distinction—the booksellers’ commercial interest in the argument 
cannot be discounted—but voted to treat copyright as a statutory grant, 
equivalent to patent, rather than the reverse.33  
The judgment in Donaldson did not end the relevant history, either 
legally or epistemologically, but the preceding brief summary highlights 
several themes that still appear, sometimes in bits and pieces, in modern 
intellectual property jurisprudence. First, in epistemological terms the 
divide between text and object—so fundamental to modern intellectual 
property law—was, and remains, more complex than is often 
acknowledged. The fact that there was an epistemology of things 
centuries ago is itself worth noting for its relevance to modern law, in 
relation to the distinction between patent law and “nature,” the 
distinction between patent law and copyright law, and the distinction 
between the intangible inventions that comprise the subject matter of 
patents, the intangible creations that comprise the subject matter of 
copyright, and the tangible embodiments of both that are the subject 
matter of chattel property law. History teaches that each of these 
distinctions is, in a different way, a form of the pursuit of knowledge for 
the common and individual good. Second, it is neither fair in historical 
terms nor accurate in pragmatic terms to identify any one of these 
epistemological distinctions as leading necessarily to the superiority of 
one form of knowledge in relation to any other, that is, to identify some 
subject as relevant to “intellectual” property or knowledge law and some 
as not. Scientific and technical practice is recognized and rewarded in 
intellectual property law today, we believe, because of the distinct ways in 
which those forms of knowledge advance society’s interests. One might 
characterize patents today as encouragement for “applied truth”—the 
purest form of knowledge—without stretching the rhetoric of the law too 
far. Smith’s work suggests how much more complicated that perspective 
truly should be; Johns’s work suggests that the complexity is not limited 
 
conveys the same style and sentiment, is the same identical work, which was produced 
by the author’s invention and labour. But a duplicate of a mechanic engine is, at best, 
but a resemblance of the other, and a resemblance can never be the same identical 
thing. It must be composed of different materials, and will be more or less perfect in 
the workmanship. Although therefore the inventor of a machine may not be injured 
at common law, by the sale of a work made like his, it will not follow, that an author is 
not injured by the surreptitious sale of a work that is absolutely and specifically his 
own.” Id. See also JOHNS, supra note 26, at 134. 
32 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). 
33 Donaldson, 98 Eng. Rep. at 257–58. 
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to patent law and in fact is inextricably linked with the origins of 
copyright. Science, both in the modern sense of that term and in its 
eighteenth century sense—universal knowledge34—is bound up as much 
with “artisanal” claims to truth (the work of the hand) as it is with 
“intellectual claims to truth” (the work of the head). The classical divide 
between what we now call arts and sciences was, at the onset of the 
Scientific Revolution that appears to have reinforced that divide, cross-
cut by knowledge production across those categories and the social 
classes that represented them. 
B. Knowledge in State and Society 
The epistemological histories of intellectual property disciplines 
cannot be divorced from their political contexts, but the politics bear 
independent consideration. The English Statute of Monopolies of 1624 is 
generally regarded as the prototype for modern patent statutes. It barred 
the Crown from granting “lettres Patentes” (letters patents) except in 
extraordinary circumstances—the production or introduction to the state 
of “new manufactures.”35 The standard account of this development 
recites the Crown’s history of granting letters patents, better regarded as 
privileges than exclusive or property rights, as tools of royal dispensation 
and reward and the abuse of that power, leading to anti-monopoly 
sentiment in Parliament and, eventually, to the Statute.36 
That account sometimes omits one or both of two key elements of 
the political economy of the early seventeenth century. First, the conflict 
over monopolies extended beyond manufactures, to printing (that is, to 
books, among other things), which was subject to extensive independent 
regulation within the commercial sphere.37 Second, the impact and 
significance of the Statute, and the political and economic history that 
followed over the next 150 years, culminating in Donaldson, had as much 
to do with the distribution of power between what we would refer to as 
 
34 See EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 125–26 (2002). 
35 Statute of Monopolies, 1624, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (Eng.). The limitation of state-
granted monopolies to the production or introduction to the country of “new 
manufactures” was subject to some important limitations, including patents or 
privileges of unlimited duration on the production of ordnance and gunpowder, and 
on printing, both of which could be continued—and were. Id.  
36 See, e.g., Oren Bracha, The Commodification of Patents 1600–1836: How Patents 
Became Rights and Why We Should Care, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 177, 191–92 (2004) 
(evaluating the development of early English patent law in institutional terms); Craig 
Allen Nard & Andrew P. Morriss, Constitutionalizing Patents: From Venice to Philadelphia, 
2 REV. L. & ECON. 223, 258 (2006) (describing the Statute of Monopolies as the 
resolution of an interest-group conflict between the Crown and Parliament regarding 
authority over monopolies).  
37 The famous Case of Monopolies invalidated a royal monopoly on a printed 
work: playing cards. Darcy v. Allein (The Case of Monopolies), (1602) 77 Eng. Rep. 
1260, 1260 (K.B.). 
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the state (in historical context, the government) and civil and 
commercial society (in context, the stationers who regulated the book 
trade) as it did with the concept of exclusive rights for inventors and 
inventions. 
The production of printed texts in England in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries was regulated primarily by the Stationers’ Company, 
a private association (or, one should say, the private association) of 
London printers and booksellers.38 A member acquiring a manuscript 
would record the “copy” in the register of the Company, assuring that 
member’s exclusivity in the text as a matter of the Stationers’ regulation, 
enforceable by the Stationers’ agents and in the Stationers’ court.39 The 
Stationers Company was essentially a closed, private guild—if imperfect 
in its enforcement practices—which purposefully and explicitly aligned 
its interest in regulating fair commercial practices in the book trade with 
the interests of social order and welfare.40 The claim was not an early 
version of a modern utilitarian idea (what would be good for the 
Stationers would be good for society); rather, the claim appears to have 
been that the Stationers assumed a kind of trusteeship with respect to the 
form and content of the knowledge that constituted the subject matter of 
the public sphere. In science, the Royal Society bid to assume a 
comparable position.41 
Printing patents, royal privileges guaranteeing exclusivity with 
respect to a particular text, undertook in practice to regulate parts of the 
book trade in ways that were analogous to, if not precisely identical to, 
the authority assumed by the Stationers’ Company.42 Where subject 
matter overlapped, printing privileges supervened the Company’s 
interest, and the Company members also received privileges for certain 
books or for classes of books. The production and distribution of a text 
that was the subject of a printing privilege was regulated by the Crown, 
rather than by the Company, creating what in effect was—given the 
avowed purposes of the Stationers’ regime—a dual system of social 
control. When Parliament moved to enact the Statute of Monopolies, 
therefore, the question was not only the existence of monopolies, 
particularly monopolies in books, but the source and purpose of 
monopolies in books. The question was also printing patents.43 The effect 
of the Statute of Monopolies, as it applied to the book trade, was not to 
 
38 In that era, members would be described more as manufacturers of books than 
as publishers (firms that contracted with authors and with printers) in a modern 
sense, although over the course of the Stationers’ history, booksellers eventually drew 
ahead of printers as matters of social hierarchy and economic influence. 
39 See JOHNS, supra note 26, at 17–18, 25–26. 
40 See id. at 25–30. 
41 See id. at 69–70. 
42 See id. at 28. 
43 See MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 16–17, 23–
24 (1993) (describing printing patents as “privileges” and suggesting that they should 
be regarded more as forms of patronage than as forms of property). 
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abolish monopolies altogether or even to abolish monopolies in books; 
printing patents were left untouched by the Statute.44  
Rather, by permitting monopolies in books to continue while other 
monopolies were strictly regulated, the Statute focused attention on the 
respective roles of the Crown and the commercial community regarding 
trade in books. Should the monopolies granted by the Stationers’ 
Company be insulated from state-sanctioned competition? Over the 
succeeding century and a half, the struggle continued over the locus of 
social control of printed knowledge. Should that remain with the state, or 
should it shift to the commercial sphere? The state charter supporting 
the Stationers’ authority lapsed in 1695,45 and the turbulence that 
followed produced the first modern copyright statute, the Statute of 
Anne. That statute vested the copy in a manuscript, in the first instance, 
in the individual author of a book, rather than in the printer who 
acquired the manuscript and registered the copy.46 But it took the 
judgment in Donaldson in 1774, rejecting the co-existence of literary 
property and copyright in the same material, to give the statute its social 
and economic bite. As some of this dust began to settle in the early 
eighteenth century, the case for literary property as a natural right had 
been rejected, and copyrights and patents had been put on equivalent 
legal footing as state-enforced property rights. The Stationers’ role as 
guardian of commerce in knowledge, founded on the premise of literary 
property and non-interference by the state, had been undone. A new 
class of publishers started to grow up, succeeding to the booksellers’ 
status based on their access to the knowledge creators: authors. The 
artisans on whose printing skill the Stationers had built their enterprise 
receded to craft status.  
That shift is easy enough for a modern reader to comprehend in 
economic terms, but I focus on its political and institutional implications. 
The question was allocation of authority for determining whether a 
particular monopoly in knowledge would serve the public interest. Under 
what circumstances should competition be accepted or encouraged and 
under what circumstances should it be condemned as a piracy, inimical 
to public order? Would these determinations be functions of the state or 
civil society? What form would that authority take in either case? By what 
standards would claims of new knowledge, authoritative knowledge, 
authentic knowledge, or harmful knowledge be established by the state? 
By what standards would these things be established by private interests, 
as agents of commerce and society? 
None of these questions is entirely absent from contemporary 
debates, but contemporary versions rarely are set in the historical context 
 
44 See id. at 46. 
45 See JOHNS, supra note 26, at 111. 
46 Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). 
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outlined here.47 Historians have discussed the meaning of the Statute of 
Monopolies in the context of contests for control between Parliament 
and the King, anticipating the Glorious Revolution and the Restoration.48 
The better uses of history here involve appreciating the tidal features of 
the struggle for control of knowledge between the state, on the one 
hand, and society, represented by the commercial interests of the 
Stationers’ Company, on the other, that began around the time of the 
Statute of Monopolies at the beginning of the seventeenth century and 
that continued in England for nearly 200 years. The Statute of 
Monopolies drew a line between material knowledge and text-based 
knowledge based on “new manufactures.”49 The Statute of Anne, as later 
interpreted in Donaldson, drew a related but different line between 
society and the state, based on “author”-ship, or what was to take on the 
color of creativity or novelty. The epistemological account recited in the 
last Section, and the Scientific Revolution that took place during the 
seventeenth century, together suggest that the idea of knowledge as 
represented in “manufactures” and in books was, even then, potentially 
unstable. It is no surprise that the bases for allocating authority over 
these things should have been less than stable as well.  
C. Elite and Vernacular Knowledge 
Philosophy and politics intersect with important but independent 
social and cultural themes. As the Scientific Revolution approached, the 
useful or mechanical arts—including the craft of printing, the trade that 
was responsible for the production and distribution of books—were, as 
Pamela Smith suggests, rather broadly distributed in the hands (literally) 
of the people, who organized themselves into companies and guilds and 
passed their knowledge from hand to hand (hand to eye, hand to ear, 
and so forth) via craft objects and personal instruction.50 This was 
vernacular knowledge. The practitioners of the liberal arts, scholars, were 
found among elite institutions: universities, the church, the state, and 
particularly courts. Their knowledge was encoded in texts, access to 
which was generally limited to other members of the elite. Theoretical 
knowledge (knowledge of the mind) was relatively concentrated; 
practical knowledge (knowledge of the hand) was relatively distributed.  
 
47 See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, The Upside of Intellectual 
Property’s Downside, 57 UCLA L. REV. 921, 921 (2010) (arguing that the output limiting 
effects of intellectual property law can be used to suppress the production of socially 
harmful information). 
48 See HAROLD G. FOX, MONOPOLIES AND PATENTS: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY AND 
FUTURE OF THE PATENT MONOPOLY 115–16 (1947); Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the 
Development of Patents: An Intellectual History, 1550–1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1265–
72 (2001). 
49 Statute of Monopolies, 1624, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (Eng.). 
50 SMITH, supra note 19, at 7–8. 
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The Scientific Revolution, the Statute of Monopolies, and the Statute 
of Anne and its aftermath had, in combination, a profound effect on the 
production and distribution of knowledge in terms of its mapping onto 
elite and vernacular segments of society. Natural philosophers, new 
scholars, succeeded to claims of artisanal or practical knowledge of 
nature, giving presumptively elite status to what had been vernacular 
practice. The practical implications of this shift were substantial. The 
previous Section explored how the long wake of the Statute of 
Monopolies, the Statute of Anne, and the judgment in Donaldson not only 
took the Crown out of the business of monopoly privileges but also took 
the Stationers’ Company out of the business of regulating text. The 
future of knowledge regulation for both books and machines was to be 
the concept of property—patent and copyright, linked to capital and 
social class, rather than craft.51 
The social value of science, or knowledge of nature, as represented 
in things, therefore moved from its vernacular roots to a more elite 
position, but this was an elite position measured by civil society organized 
by money and power rather than by craft or discipline. The social value 
of literature, or knowledge of the mind and spirit as represented in text, 
moved in the opposite direction. In modern terms, eighteenth century 
England set the stage for a massive democratization of knowledge during 
the nineteenth century. Practical knowledge, having become “scientific,” 
grew more concentrated; theoretical knowledge grew more distributed. 
In neither case was this shift absolute, because at the heart of both 
moves was text itself, the embodiment of classical theoretical or 
conceptual knowledge and the necessarily elite form of representation 
and transmission of newly naturalized knowledge. For present purposes, 
therefore, more important than the absolute direction of either shift is 
the tension between elite and vernacular claims to the production of 
knowledge, to access to knowledge, and the relationship between the 
two. Crucially, when the scholarly elite adopted the epistemological 
stance of their artisanal forebears, the idea of nature as a route to 
knowledge was married to the text-oriented practices of traditional 
scholars. Knowledge would be produced by hand, but shared in print. 
Commerce in books was necessarily aligned with the practices of the 
cultural elite.  
In other words, as both copyright and patent evolved during the 
eighteenth century, the relationships among text, machine, and 
vernacular and elite audiences remained central to both knowledge 
practices and to law. Perhaps the most fundamental advances in the 
modern conception of patent law stem from English law of the late 
eighteenth century: the idea that an invention and rights in that 
invention should be measured by what patent law today refers to as the 
PHOSITA and that the invention be measured by a published description 
 
51 See JOHNS, supra note 26, at 140. 
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of what the inventor had produced over and beyond “principles,” or what 
we would today call “laws of nature” and “abstract ideas.”52 Both doctrines 
can be understood as efforts to help audiences make sense of the 
relationship between word and object, but they did so in a way that gave 
specific structure to ideas regarding the social structures surrounding 
access to and production of knowledge. English courts concluded that no 
invention was subject to claims of property (as against the general public 
good) until and unless it was rendered in some published (i.e., authored) 
form, and the criterion for satisfactory publication (i.e., specification) 
was that “a skilled craftsman in an appropriate field must be able to 
replicate the device from the document.”53 Patent law and patent practice 
thereby acquired their modern cast as methods of “teaching.” The 
knowledge to be communicated was abstracted for transmission purposes 
and made part of the modern patent bargain: exclusive rights in 
exchange for disclosure.54 The elite reader became the measure of 
public, or vernacular, interests in knowledge.55 Later in the eighteenth 
century, James Madison similarly recognized a link between the distinct 
interests in knowledge represented by individual creators and the mass of 
readers and customers. Concerning the wisdom of Congressional power 
to enact protection for authors and inventors, he wrote: “The copy right 
of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right at 
common law. The right to useful inventions, seems with equal reason to 
belong to the inventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases, 
with the claims of individuals.”56 
 
52 In contemporary American patent law, these doctrines appear in the Patent 
Act in sections 103 (nonobviousness) and 112 (written description and specification). 
35 U.S.C. §§ 103, 112 (2006). 
53 Liardet v. Johnson, (1778) 62 Eng. Rep. 1000 (K.B.), 1 CARPMAEL’S PATENT 
CASES 35, 37 (London, A Macintosh 1843) (emphasizing the significance of teaching 
via a specification); JOHNS, supra note 26, at 140–41 (citing Morris v. Bransom, (1776) 
Bull. N.P. 76, 1 CARPMAEL’S PATENT CASES 30, 34 (London, A. Macintosh 1843) 
(Mansfield, C.J.) (affirming the validity of a patent upon an improvement to an 
existing machine, signifying that progress, rather than the machine itself, was the 
touchstone of patent law). The relevant portion of the report of Liardet is: 
The meaning of the specification is, that others may be taught to do the thing 
for which the patent is granted; and if the specification is false, the patent is void, 
for after the term the public ought to have the benefit of the discovery. Hence 
the law requires as the price the patentee should pay to the public for his 
monopoly, that he should, to the very best of his knowledge, give the fullest and 
most sufficient description of all the particulars on which the effect depends. 
Id. 
54 See Mossoff, supra note 48, at 1288–92. 
55 The development of the idea of the “author” in late eighteenth century and 
nineteenth century literary property concepts plausibly signifies a comparable 
development in copyright law, the social production of an elite guide to a domain of 
knowledge designed for vernacular consumption. See Martha Woodmansee, The 
Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the ‘Author,’ 17 
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUDIES 425, 426, 430–37, 445 (1984). 
56 THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 234 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005). 
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III. ISOLATING AND PURIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY’S 
SUBJECT MATTER 
In this Part, I offer a brief and high-level overview of significant 
developments in the law of the subject matter of American intellectual 
property disciplines, measured primarily by key opinions of the Supreme 
Court of the United States. This overview suggests how the themes 
described in Part II were manifested in later legal developments—and, 
eventually, how the dynamism and stresses apparent in my descriptions 
above abated—after the law made its way across the Atlantic. 
England in the eighteenth century witnessed only the beginnings of 
modern intellectual property law. Later English developments and 
American developments each have had their own distinct narratives and 
influences. The early history is relevant because it helps modern readers 
interpret later developments, particularly from the standpoint of the 
separate domains of patent law, copyright law, and even trademark law, 
and not because modern law should align with the form or structure of 
its antecedents. I do not claim that modern law has been or should be 
limited specifically by those historical patterns. My point is precisely the 
opposite: The patterns identified in Part II are historically contingent, 
limited by the social, economic, technological, philosophical, and 
political conditions of their times, but they gave birth to what we now call 
patent law, copyright law, and even, to a degree, trademark law. The later 
evolution of those doctrines occurred in the light and shadow of those 
same patterns, as courts, legislators, and litigants explored and developed 
the issues and questions that were first framed 300 years ago.  
The themes identified in Part II—the distinction between artisanal 
and artistic claims to knowledge, the distinction between state and society 
as arbiter of claims to knowledge, and the distinction between elite and 
vernacular arguments about the value of knowledge—illuminate the 
rough outlines of the point that I made in the Introduction. In the two 
centuries since the establishment of federal patent and copyright law, the 
Supreme Court of the United States (and Congress, often responding to 
the Court) has moved gradually but clearly in the direction of identifying 
subject matter questions that have the effect of isolating each of these 
disciplines from any other. There is nothing inherently wrong about that 
evolution; in many respects it is to be expected in a common law system 
and a maturing market economy increasingly dominated by industry. But 
as the several conditions implicit in that summary now begin to 
dissipate—the line between materiality and literacy blurs, the line 
between state and society blurs, and the line between elite and vernacular 
blurs—an approach dominated by doctrinal segregation and channeling 
loses its traction in a pluralistic society and a diverse economy. The Court 
and the law might find traction anew by returning to ancient themes with 
fresh eyes and ears; it might find traction by identifying new themes in 
current conditions. The next Part explores that topic in a preliminary 
way. 
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The following is not an exhaustive account of the cases. They are 
used to illustrate by example, and in chronological order, how the 
subject matter domains of the three major intellectual property 
disciplines emerged, originally and explicitly in the shadow of older 
patterns, and later, independent of them. The chronological ordering is 
purposeful. By disrupting a retrospective effort to order and organize the 
cases by legal rule, I want to emphasize how the Court’s jurisprudence 
moved from a position of greater recognition of the integrated character 
of what I (retrospectively) call knowledge to a position where that 
integration seems far less possible, and I want to emphasize the somewhat 
disordered progression of the history of intellectual property law as a 
whole.  
A. Nineteenth Century Cases 
Pennock v. Dialogue57 dealt with an early version of what is now 
referred to as the on-sale bar to patenting, the idea that an invention 
cannot be the subject of a patent if it has previously been on sale to the 
public at large for more than a statutory period of time.58 The Court 
distinguished the inventor’s role as an (elite) inventor from his possible 
status as a (commercial) proprietor, which would invalidate the patent: 
While one great object [of the patent statute] was, by holding out a 
reasonable reward to inventors, and giving them an exclusive right 
to their inventions for a limited period, to stimulate the efforts of 
genius; the main object was “to promote the progress of science and 
useful arts;” and this could be done best, by giving the public at 
large a right to make, construct, use, and vend the thing invented, 
at as early a period as possible; having a due regard to the rights of 
the inventor. If an inventor should be permitted to hold back from 
the knowledge of the public the secrets of his invention; if he 
should for a long period of years retain the monopoly, and make, 
and sell his invention publicly, and thus gather the whole profits of 
it, relying upon his superior skill and knowledge of the structure; 
and then, and then only, when the danger of competition should 
force him to secure the exclusive right, he should be allowed to 
take out a patent, and thus exclude the public from any farther use 
than what should be derived under it during his fourteen years; it 
would materially retard the progress of science and the useful arts, 
and give a premium to those who should be least prompt to 
communicate their discoveries.59 
Wheaton v. Peters was the first major opinion of the Court to deal with 
copyright, and as copyright scholars know well, the Court concluded that 
the federal copyright statute, with its limited term and scope of rights, 
extinguished the concept of literary property with respect to works that 
 
57 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1 (1829). 
58 Id. at 23–24. See also Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 65 (1998).  
59 Pennock, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 19. 
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fell within its scope.60 This brought American law into line with its 
English cousin. As debates preceding the judgment in Donaldson had 
done, the Court justified its conclusion by drawing an explicit parallel 
between an author and inventor: 
 In what respect does the right of an author differ from that of an 
individual who has invented a most useful and valuable machine? In 
the production of this, his mind has been as intensely engaged, as 
long; and, perhaps, as usefully to the public, as any distinguished 
author in the composition of his book.  
 The result of their labours may be equally beneficial to society, 
and in their respective spheres they may be alike distinguished for 
mental vigour. Does the common law give a perpetual right to the 
author, and withhold it from the inventor? And yet it has never 
been pretended that the latter could hold, by the common law, any 
property in his invention, after he shall have sold it publicly.61 
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood is remembered as a key source of the 
proposition that invention should be measured against the concept of 
the “ordinary mechanic,” whose output is not, in the main, worthy of 
legal recognition.62 The Court in Hotchkiss spoke, as it did in Wheaton, of a 
contrast between efforts of the hand (the mechanic) and of the mind (in 
this case, the inventor): 
[U]nless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of 
fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application 
of it to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by an 
ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an 
absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute 
essential elements of every invention. In other words, the 
improvement is the work of the skilful mechanic, not that of the 
inventor.63 
O’Reilly v. Morse64 is famous for its invalidation of the eighth claim of 
Samuel Morse’s patent on telegraphy, on the ground that it too broadly 
claimed an exclusive right to “the use of the motive power of the electric 
or galvanic current, which [the inventor calls] electro-magnetism, 
however developed, for making or printing intelligible characters, letters, 
or signs, at any distances.”65 Later courts and many scholars interpret the 
case as invalidating Morse’s claim on the ground that Morse had not 
invented the natural principle of electro-magnetism, which could not be 
patented in any event.66 An equally good and more useful reading of the 
 
60 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). 
61 Id. at 657–58. 
62 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 267 (1851).  
63 Id. 
64 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854). 
65 Id. at 86, 120. 
66 See, e.g., The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 534 (1888); Alan L. Durham, 
Natural Laws and Inevitable Infringement, 93 MINN. L. REV. 933, 940 (2009); Robert A. 
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opinion is that Professor Morse had invented a new telegraphic device 
but had failed to adequately reduce that device to a textual form that 
corresponded to the breadth of his invention. 
Winans v. Denmead was an early application of what became known as 
the doctrine of equivalents in patent law, testing the limits of the 
proposition that the text of an inventor’s written specification defined 
the thing invented and limited the patent right.67 Notably, the case was 
decided in the era before patent practice adopted the expectation of 
peripheral claiming, the idea that the language of the patent’s claims 
defined the outer limit of the invention. Rather than establishing the 
principle of equivalents, therefore, the Court was emphasizing the 
importance of fair interpretation of the inventor’s claim, using a 
rhetorical framework that looked to differentiate an inventive idea from 
a particular machine.68 The Court wrote, distinguishing the nature of the 
plaintiff’s inventiveness from the defendant’s copying: 
Merely to change the form of a machine is the work of a 
constructor, not of an inventor; such a change cannot be deemed 
an invention. Nor does the plaintiff’s patent rest upon such a 
change. To change the form of an existing machine, and by means 
of such change to introduce and employ other mechanical 
principles or natural powers, or, as it is termed, a new mode of 
operation, and thus attain a new and useful result, is the subject of a 
patent. Such is the basis on which the plaintiff’s patent rests.69 
. . . . 
 Where form and substance are inseparable, it is enough to look 
at the form only. Where they are separable; where the whole 
substance of the invention may be copied in a different form, it is 
the duty of courts and juries to look through the form for the 
substance of the invention—for that which entitled the inventor to 
his patent, and which the patent was designed to secure; where that 
is found, there is an infringement; and it is not a defence, that it is 
embodied in a form not described, and in terms claimed by the 
patentee.70 
Elizabeth v. Pavement Co.,71 still cited today on the question of whether 
use of an invention before a patent application is filed invalidates a 
 
Kreiss, Patent Protection for Computer Programs and Mathematical Algorithms: The 
Constitutional Limitations on Patentable Subject Matter, 29 N.M. L. REV. 31, 69 (1999). 
67 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 343 (1854). 
68 See Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Historic and Modern Doctrines of Equivalents and 
Claiming the Future, Part I (1790–1870), 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 371, 393–98 
(2005). 
69 Winans, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 341. 
70 Id. at 343. 
71 97 U.S. 126 (1878). 
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patent because it was undertaken publicly or (instead) experimentally,72 
relied on a crucial distinction between the inventor acting as, in effect, a 
scientist, and the inventor acting as a commercial proprietor: 
In either case, such use is not a public use, within the meaning of 
the statute, so long as the inventor is engaged, in good faith, in 
testing its operation. He may see cause to alter it and improve it, or 
not. His experiments will reveal the fact whether any and what 
alterations may be necessary. If durability is one of the qualities to 
be attained, a long period, perhaps years, may be necessary to 
enable the inventor to discover whether his purpose is 
accomplished. And though, during all that period, he may not find 
that any changes are necessary, yet he may be justly said to be using 
his machine only by way of experiment; and no one would say that 
such a use, pursued with a bona fide intent of testing the qualities of 
the machine, would be a public use, within the meaning of the 
statute. So long as he does not voluntarily allow others to make it 
and use it, and so long as it is not on sale for general use, he keeps 
the invention under his own control, and does not lose his title to a 
patent.73 
In The Trade-Mark Cases, the Court was asked to identify a valid basis 
for a federal trademark statute, rather than the legitimate scope of 
copyright or patent law.74 The Court spoke principally in negative terms: 
trademarks were not “founded in the creative powers of the mind,” akin 
to copyrighted writings, and could be (and ordinarily are) protected via 
long periods of use, rather than via demonstrations of originality or 
invention or other “work of the brain.”75 “[I]n neither case does it 
depend upon novelty, invention, discovery, or any work of the brain. It 
requires no fancy or imagination, no genius, no laborious thought. It is 
simply founded on priority of appropriation.”76 That distinction took 
trademark law beyond the scope of Congressional power to act under the 
Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution, which extends only to 
authors and inventors, and to their respective writings and discoveries.77 
Baker v. Selden,78 usually invoked today as a foundational case for 
copyright’s distinction between unprotected idea and protected 
expression,79 has been shown convincingly to have depended originally 
on the Court’s sense of the divide between the subject matters of 
 
72 See, e.g., Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1362 (Fed 
Cir. 2010); Atlanta Attachment Co. v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 516 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008).  
73 Elizabeth, 97 U.S. at 135. 
74 100 U.S. 82 (1879). 
75 Id. at 94. 
76 Id. 
77 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
78 101 U.S. 99 (1880). 
79 See, e.g., Frye v. YMCA Camp Kitaki, 617 F.3d 1005, 1008 (8th Cir. 2010); Kay 
Berry, Inc. v. Taylor Gifts, Inc., 421 F.3d 199, 208 (3d Cir. 2005).  
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copyright and patent.80 One might translate that divide thematically into 
the divide between text and machine, between text and process, or 
between text and principle; all are represented to a degree in the 
opinion.81 Selden’s system of forms for double-entry bookkeeping could 
not be protected by copyright, according to the Court, because Selden 
was in effect asking for protection for the art to be practiced by the 
system, and that protection could be given only by the Patent Office, if at 
all: 
To give to the author of the book an exclusive property in the art 
described therein, when no examination of its novelty has ever 
been officially made, would be a surprise and a fraud upon the 
public. That is the province of letters-patent, not of copyright. The 
claim to an invention or discovery of an art or manufacture must be 
subjected to the examination of the Patent Office before an 
exclusive right therein can be obtained; and it can only be secured 
by a patent from the government.82  
Tilghman v. Proctor83 took up the nature of invention, holding that the 
emergence of a process in a prior context, by accident and without 
consciousness or awareness of its significance as an invention, did not bar 
patenting that same process by a later inventor working intentionally, 
that is, as an inventor:  
 We do not regard the accidental formation of fat acid in 
Perkins’s steam cylinder from the tallow introduced to lubricate the 
piston (if the scum which rose on the water issuing from the 
ejection pipe was fat acid) as of any consequence in this inquiry. 
What the process was by which it was generated or formed was 
never fully understood. Those engaged in the art of making 
candles, or in any other art in which fat acids are desirable, 
certainly never derived the least hint from this accidental 
phenomenon in regard to any practicable process for 
manufacturing such acids. 
 The accidental effects produced in Daniell’s water barometer 
and in Walther’s process for purifying fats and oils preparatory to 
soap-making, are of the same character. They revealed no process 
for the manufacture of fat acids. If the acids were accidentally and 
unwittingly produced, whilst the operators were in pursuit of other 
and different results, without exciting attention and without its even 
being known what was done or how it had been done, it would be 
absurd to say that this was an anticipation of Tilghman’s discovery.84 
 
80 See Pamela Samuelson, The Story of Baker v. Selden: Sharpening the Distinction 
Between Authorship and Invention, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 159, 175–78 (Jane 
C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006). 
81 See Baker, 101 U.S. at 102. 
82 Id. 
83 102 U.S. 707 (1881). 
84 Id. at 711–12. 
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Tilghman is generally regarded as the foundational case for the 
doctrine of anticipation by inherency, which has been rationalized 
according to the principle that an accidental or “inherent” invention may 
not put the device (or process) at the disposal of the public, and 
therefore ought not to be treated as a relevant part of the patent 
bargain.85 It is not, in a legal sense or a disciplinary sense, a relevant form 
of knowledge.  
Singer Manufacturing Co. v. June Manufacturing Co.86 was the first case 
at the Court to address the intersection of patent law and what has 
become known as the law of trade dress, a species of unfair competition 
and trademark law. The Court concluded that the expiration of patents 
on Singer’s sewing machines gave competitors the right, as a matter of 
law, to produce machines in the distinctive shape used by Singer, 
notwithstanding Singer’s argument that by doing so the defendant had 
engaged in acts of unfair competition.87 The Court thus began to give 
shape to the public domain at the end of the life of a patent, as in O’Reilly 
it had begun to give shape to the public domain at a patent’s beginning. 
B. Early Twentieth Century Cases 
As the twentieth century dawned, the Court’s intellectual property 
jurisprudence reflected each of the themes described in Part II, in one 
respect or another: the relationship between nature and invention, 
between text and machine, between art and science, between inventors 
and the commercial and consuming public, and between the state and 
society. In no case had a definitive line been drawn, but in broad outline 
and in the shadow of the Industrial Revolution the Court was developing 
and displaying a sense that a law of knowledge, guided by context and 
legal discipline, was emerging. As the Industrial Revolution drew to a 
close, the economic and social lessons of the nineteenth century—
including the benefits and costs of social, political, and economic 
hierarchy and the virtues of access to capital and information—were 
consolidated, absorbed, and then extended during the twentieth century. 
As a turn-of-the-century case, Singer Manufacturing Co. is exemplary in this 
regard: the Court justified the outcome of the case in the name of the 
respective “property” claims of the parties, property being partly a 
metaphor for a legal right.88 The plaintiff’s patent having expired, the 
right to produce the relevant machines became “public” property,89 and 
any alleged injury to the plaintiff’s remaining property interest—what 
modern trademark law likely would refer to as “goodwill”—was 
 
85 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 371, 383–
84 (2005). 
86 163 U.S. 169 (1896). 
87 Id. at 185. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 185, 203. 
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immaterial.90 The relevant knowledge interests were becoming 
increasingly abstracted and differentiated for purposes of legal and 
economic markets. On the expiration of the patent, the public was 
entitled not to the knowledge of the inventor, but to “the right to make 
the machine in the form in which it was constructed during the patent.”91 
However, the subtle shift in rhetoric is indicative of a deeper conceptual 
progression. 
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.92 evidenced and extended that 
conceptual approach in the context of copyright law. The Court 
concluded that the subject matter of copyright consisted of “the copy” 
(today we would say “an original” work), which Justice Holmes wrote: 
is the personal reaction of an individual upon nature. Personality 
always contains something unique. It expresses its singularity even 
in handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it something 
irreducible, which is one man’s alone. That something he may 
copyright unless there is a restriction in the words of the act.93  
The Court was doing for copyright what it had previously done for 
patents in O’Reilly—define the subject matter of the law with reference to 
the natural world—but now in more abstract terms. With respect to 
adjacent issues, the representation of legally protected material, and the 
definition of that material by a disciplinary community or by the state, 
the Court abdicated:  
Certainly works are not the less connected with the fine arts 
because their pictorial quality attracts the crowd and therefore gives 
them a real use—if use means to increase trade and to help to make 
money. A picture is none the less a picture and none the less a 
subject of copyright that it is used for an advertisement. 
 . . . . 
 It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to 
the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of 
pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious 
limits. At the one extreme some works of genius would be sure to 
miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive 
until the public had learned the new language in which their 
author spoke. It may be more than doubted, for instance, whether 
the etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet would have been 
sure of protection when seen for the first time. At the other end, 
copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed to a public 
less educated than the judge. Yet if they command the interest of 
any public, they have a commercial value—it would be bold to say 
 
90 Id. at 185. 
91 Id. 
92 188 U.S. 239 (1903). 
93 Id. at 250. 
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that they have not an aesthetic and educational value—and the 
taste of any public is not to be treated with contempt.94  
Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co.95 pushed an equally 
abstract framework in the patent context. The case involved the 
argument that a patentee who did not practice the patent was not 
entitled to invoke the equitable powers of the court to preserve the 
exclusivity of his patent right.96 The Court rejected this argument. 
Patents, it noted, were species of property and their exclusivity was a 
matter of right.97 But the Court noted the special status of inventors and 
the distinct services that justified their special treatment: 
In other words, the language of complete monopoly has been 
employed, and though at first only a remedy at law was given for a 
violation of the right, a remedy in equity was given as early as 1819. 
There has been no qualification, however, of the right, except as 
hereinafter stated. An exception which, we may now say, shows the 
extent of the right—a right so explicitly given and so complete that 
it would seem to need no further explanation than the word of the 
statute. It has, however, received explanation in a number of cases 
which bring out clearly the services rendered by an inventor to the 
arts and sciences and to the public. Those cases declare that he 
receives nothing from the law that he did not have before, and that 
the only effect of the patent is to restrain others from 
manufacturing and using that which he has invented. And it was 
further said in that case that the inventor could have kept his 
discovery to himself, but to induce a disclosure of it Congress has, 
by its legislation, made in pursuance of the Constitution, 
guaranteed to him an exclusive right to it for a limited time, and 
the purpose of the patent is to protect him in this monopoly—not 
to give him a use which he did not have before, “but only to 
separate to him an exclusive use.”98  
White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., another copyright case, 
determined that reproduction of a copyrighted musical composition by 
means of a player piano roll did not constitute making an infringing 
“copy” of the protected work.99 Congress promptly changed the law—a 
copy of a work has infringed ever since, even if the copy could be 
understood by humans only via an intervening mechanical or electronic 
process.100 Mostly lost to later history is the fact that the Court was 
mindful of the relationship between public and expert audiences: 
 
94 Id. at 251–52. 
95 210 U.S. 405 (1908). 
96 Id. at 406–07. 
97 Id. at 429. 
98 Id. at 423–24 (quoting United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 167 U.S. 224, 
249 (1897)) (citation omitted). 
99 209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908). 
100 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (definition of “copies”). 
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The fact is clearly established in the testimony in this case that even 
those skilled in the making of these rolls are unable to read them as 
musical compositions, as those in staff notation are read by the 
performer. It is true that there is some testimony to the effect that 
great skill and patience might enable the operator to read this 
record as he could a piece of music written in staff notation. But the 
weight of the testimony is emphatically the other way, and they are 
not intended to be read as an ordinary piece of sheet music, which 
to those skilled in the art conveys, by reading, in playing or singing, 
definite impressions of the melody.101 
This likely should be read as a statement that no expert musicianship 
should be required to assess copyright infringement; the “ordinary” 
public should be the relevant standard. The reference to those “skilled in 
the art” shows that the Court, as in Bleistein, intended to contrast the case 
with the sensibility of patent law. 
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus dealt with the enforceability of a restrictive 
legend printed in each copy of a copyrighted book, purporting to limit 
the price at which further re-sales of those copies could occur.102 The 
Court held that the legend was not enforceable,103 giving twentieth 
century force to what has become known as the first sale doctrine in 
copyright,104 a cousin of the exhaustion doctrine in patent law. Much of 
the opinion is given over to reciting and distinguishing a line of Supreme 
Court cases in patent law that gave effect to restrictive legends printed or 
stamped on particular copies of patented items.105 In contrast to Wheaton 
v. Peters, in which parallels between copyright and patent law persuaded 
the Court to treat the two statutes as essentially identical in their effect on 
existing claims of property right,106 in Bobbs-Merrill, the Court emphasized 
their differences: 
 We may say in passing, disclaiming any intention to indicate our 
views as to what would be the rights of parties in circumstances 
similar to the present case under the patent laws, that there are 
differences between the patent and copyright statutes in the extent 
of the protection granted by them. This was recognized by Judge 
Lurton, who wrote a leading case on the subject in the Federal 
courts (The Button Fastener Case, 77 Fed. Rep. 288), for he said in the 
subsequent case of Park & Sons v. Hartman, 153 Fed. Rep. 24:  
 “There are such wide differences between the right of 
multiplying and vending copies of a production protected by the 
copyright statute and the rights secured to an inventor under the 
 
101 White-Smith Music Publ’g Co., 209 U.S. at 18. 
102 210 U.S. 339, 341–43 (1908). 
103 Id. at 351. 
104 See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006) (allowing resale of a lawfully made copy by its 
owner). 
105 Bobbs-Merrill Co., 210 U.S. at 343–46. 
106 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 657–58 (1834). 
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patent statutes, that the cases which relate to the one subject are 
not altogether controlling as to the other.”107 
Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.108 affirmed and extended the 
principle developed in Singer: The expiration of a patent gave the 
public—including competitors—the right to practice the invention 
represented in the patent, even to the extent that the result of the 
competition was to produce a thing that copied the distinctive 
appearance of the patented product.109 In Kellogg, this was “shredded 
wheat” breakfast cereal.110 The Court’s opinion is less than clear as to the 
precise basis for the result, but its tenor was clear. The Court confirmed 
that the plaintiff’s property in the design and manufacture of the cereal 
had passed from a limited domain regulated by the state to the broader 
public marketplace and was subject only to ongoing duties, grounded in 
the law of unfair competition, to avoid deception: 
 Kellogg Company is undoubtedly sharing in the goodwill of the 
article known as “Shredded Wheat”; and thus is sharing in a market 
which was created by the skill and judgment of plaintiff’s 
predecessor and has been widely extended by vast expenditures in 
advertising persistently made. But that is not unfair. Sharing in the 
goodwill of an article unprotected by patent or trade-mark is the 
exercise of a right possessed by all—and in the free exercise of 
which the consuming public is deeply interested. There is no 
evidence of passing off or deception on the part of the Kellogg 
Company; and it has taken every reasonable precaution to prevent 
confusion or the practice of deception in the sale of its product.111 
C. Mid-Twentieth Century Cases 
Cases decided in the middle part of the twentieth century continued 
the process of abstracting and dividing patent questions from copyright 
questions from trademark questions. The Court’s jurisprudence 
necessarily absorbed the instructions of Congress (which had in many 
instances absorbed the teachings of earlier Supreme Court cases), with 
new statutes in each field: a new Copyright Act in 1909,112 the Lanham 
Act in 1946,113 and the Patent Act in 1952.114 As lawyers and judges refined 
the understanding of intellectual property rights as legal abstractions 
governing knowledge-based abstractions (inventions, works of 
authorship, and marks), the Court gradually grew more comfortable with 
 
107 Bobbs-Merrill Co., 210 U.S. at 345–46 (quoting Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 
F. 24, 28 (6th Cir. 1907)). 
108 305 U.S. 111 (1938). 
109 Id. at 118. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 122 (footnote omitted). 
112 Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909). 
113 Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946). 
114 Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952). 
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sharp subject matter definitions for patent, copyright, and trademark law 
that often allowed multiple forms of right to co-exist in a single 
intangible thing. 
Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.115 invalidated patent claims 
to certain strains of the Rhizobium bacteria combined as an inoculant, 
on the ground that the inventor had claimed merely a product (or 
properties) of the natural world, “like the heat of the sun, electricity, or 
the qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all 
men. They are manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and 
reserved exclusively to none.”116 
Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.117 
introduced the modern doctrine of equivalents to patent law, extending 
the scope of patent claims (now written as peripheral claims) beyond 
their literal scope, as interpreted.118 The “principle” of the invention 
became a free-floating thing, protected in law from “fraud” on the patent 
at the hands of knowledgeable but unscrupulous artisans, that is, fellow 
experts.119 The Court wrote: 
An important factor is whether persons reasonably skilled in the art 
would have known of the interchangeability of an ingredient not 
contained in the patent with one that was. 
 A finding of equivalence is a determination of fact. Proof can be 
made in any form: through testimony of experts or others versed in 
the technology; by documents, including texts and treatises; and, of 
course, by the disclosures of the prior art. Like any other issue of 
fact, final determination requires a balancing of credibility, 
persuasiveness and weight of evidence. It is to be decided by the 
trial court and that court’s decision, under general principles of 
appellate review, should not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. 
Particularly is this so in a field where so much depends upon 
familiarity with specific scientific problems and principles not 
usually contained in the general storehouse of knowledge and 
experience.120 
Under such circumstances, the accused infringer was likely to be a fellow 
member of the art but would be deemed to be acting deceptively, as a 
rival rather than as a fellow inventor.121 
 
115 333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
116 Id. at 130 (emphasis added). 
117 339 U.S. 605 (1950). 
118 See id. at 607–09.  
119 Id. at 608–09.  
120 Id. at 609–10. 
121 In that regard, the Court distinguished Graver Tank from Westinghouse v. 
Boyden Power Brake Co., the case often regarded as the establishing the “reverse” 
doctrine of equivalents. 170 U.S. 537 (1898). Under some circumstances, a finding of 
noninfringement is appropriate in a case where the patent reads on the accused 
device, because the defendant has engaged in a clear process of invention. Id. at 568. 
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Mazer v. Stein122 concluded that a three-dimensional object could be 
protected by copyright notwithstanding the fact that it was part of a 
manufactured (that is, industrial) object, in a case that extended but 
modified the Court’s effort in Baker to comprehend the relationship 
between the scope of copyright and the scope of patent.123 As a suitable 
level of abstraction, the two intellectual property regimes could co-exist 
in a single product.124 
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.125 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite 
Lighting, Inc.,126 a pair of cases decided on the same day, reinforced the 
reasoning applied in Singer and Kellogg and ruled that the inventor of an 
unpatented device (in this case, a pole lamp and a fluorescent light 
fixture) could not pursue state law unfair competition claims against 
competitors who copied the designs of those devices.127 The invalidation 
or absence of patent rights left the design of the subject device in the 
public domain.128 Because the federal government had determined the 
applicable level of intellectual property protection, no state could offer 
common law protection for the design under general commercial law 
principles, consistent with the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.129 
Sears/Compco is a landmark in the law of the public domain for patentable 
subject matter, but it is of a piece with Wheaton in clarifying the respective 
roles of the state and the commercial sphere in the regulation of 
knowledge. 
Graham v. John Deere Co.130 provided the Court’s most thorough 
explanation to date of the proposition that patentability is to be 
measured by the knowledge of the PHOSITA. The knowledge and skill 
(head and hand) of this hypothetical person should be used to measure 
the nonobviousness of an invention, under section 103 of the Patent 
Act.131 Graham modernized the original purpose of the faith that patent 
law placed in the skilled artisan. Expert knowledge was intended to 
constrain the power exercised by the state, as guardian of the broader 
public interest:  
 While we have focused attention on the appropriate standard to 
be applied by the courts, it must be remembered that the primary 
responsibility for sifting out unpatentable material lies in the Patent 
Office. To await litigation is—for all practical purposes—to 
debilitate the patent system. We have observed a notorious 
 
122 347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
123 See id. at 217–18. 
124 Id. at 217. 
125 376 U.S. 225 (1964). 
126 376 U.S. 234 (1964). 
127 Sears, Roebuck & Co., 376 U.S. at 231–32; Compco Corp., 376 U.S. at 237–38. 
128 Compco Corp., 376 U.S. at 237–38. 
129 Sears, Roebuck & Co., 376 U.S. at 231. 
130 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
131 See id. at 17–18. 
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difference between the standards applied by the Patent Office and 
by the courts. While many reasons can be adduced to explain the 
discrepancy, one may well be the free rein often exercised by 
Examiners in their use of the concept of “invention.”132 
D. Late Twentieth Century Cases 
My brief digests of older cases suggest ways in which the Court’s 
patent, copyright, and trademark jurisprudence might be linked to 
historic knowledge-oriented themes in intellectual property law, even if 
the Court itself was not always explicit in drawing those themes into its 
cases. By the late twentieth century, the Court’s jurisprudence in patent, 
copyright, and trademark law appears to have stabilized sufficiently that 
the Court tended to look inward, to the contemporary dynamics of each 
of these disciplines, rather than to broader themes concerning 
knowledge that connect them to law, practice, nature, and society.133 
Patentable subject matter increasingly depended on the statutes, policies, 
and needs of the patent system; likewise for copyright, and for 
trademark—even where these doctrines ran up against each other.  
Gottschalk v. Benson invalidated a patent on a method of data 
processing on the ground that it constituted an abstract “algorithm,” or 
an idea that was insufficiently connected to a specific apparatus or 
application.134 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty135 upheld a patent on a human-manufactured 
bacterium as a “manufacture” or “composition of matter” within the 
meaning of the Patent Act, distinguishing Funk Bros. on the ground that 
the bacterium was man-made.136 In so holding, the Court recognized that 
“[h]is discovery is not nature’s handiwork, but his own.”137 
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.138 borrowed some 
patent-style reasoning to resolve a copyright case, but in a way that made 
 
132 Id. at 18. 
133 The enactment of a new Copyright Act in 1976 enabled the Court to reset its 
understanding of copyrightable subject matter in light of new statutory language 
defining the scope of the law. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). The creation of the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982, with exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in 
patent cases, had a related impact, encouraging that court to look only to patent 
doctrine and policy in developing an integrated and consistent body of patent 
caselaw. 
134 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972); but cf. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191–93 
(1981) (upholding a patent on an industrial process for molding rubber, rather 
characterizing the claim as directed to a mathematical formula); Parker v. Flook, 437 
U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978) (invalidating a patent on a mathematical formula for 
catalytic conversion alarm limits).  
135 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
136 See id. at 309–10. 
137 Id. at 310. 
138 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
Do Not Delete 2/17/2011  6:47 PM 
2011] PATENT AS KNOWLEDGE LAW 99 
clear that the Court regarded the two doctrines as distinct in 
contemporary terms rather than of a single historical piece, despite their 
acknowledged “kinship.”139 The Court adopted a variation of the “staple 
article of commerce” doctrine from patent law and grafted it onto the 
contributory infringement doctrine in copyright law in order to 
exonerate the manufacturer of the Betamax videotape recorder from a 
claim that it had inappropriately facilitated consumer reproduction of 
television programming.140 
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.141 extended the reasoning 
of Sears/Compco with respect to state power to create intellectual property 
rights alongside the federal patent and copyright schemes.142 The Court 
ruled that states could not legislate forms of exclusive rights that offered 
patent-like protection to the designs of things or to their utility.143  
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.144 dealt again with 
the subject matter of copyright law. Borrowing generously from the 
Bleistein opinion, the Court set the bar for copyrightability about as low as 
it could be set while still having some presence.145 To be copyrightable, a 
work of authorship must be “original,” meaning that it must possess a 
modicum of creativity and must have been created by the author, rather 
than copied from some other source.146 By statute as well as by policy, no 
government agency or review is required to make this determination ex 
ante. The principle of Feist has obvious implications for the distribution 
of the knowledge of modern scientists and inventors, given the practical 
and legal requirements that their innovations be fully and fairly 
described, typically in text, as part of the patent bargain. But the Court 
did not refer to patent law. 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.147 concluded that interpretation 
of patent claims should be the province of the court rather than the jury, 
given the need for consistent interpretation of a given patent across 
possible successive lawsuits and given the Court’s conclusion that 
construction of patent claims is akin to the interpretation of written 
instruments, rather than the identification of the thing that the inventor 
produced.148  
 
139 Id. at 439. 
140 See id. at 442, 456. 
141 489 U.S. 141 (1989).  
142 See id. at 167. See also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474 
(1974) (holding that state trade secret law, which regulates knowledge by protecting 
parties who refuse to share it, is compatible with federal patent law, which rewards 
those same parties when they forego trade secret protection and disclose that 
knowledge). 
143 Id. at 168. 
144 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
145 Id. at 358–59. 
146 Id. at 345. 
147 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
148 Id. at 388–91. 
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Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc. revisited the scope of 
trademark protection for the designs of things, in this case dresses made 
of seersucker fabric and bearing appliqués.149 The Court focused on the 
different rules relevant to “product configuration” cases and “product 
packaging” cases. It noted that stricter standards for trademark 
protection should apply to the former, partly in order to avoid conflict 
with patent law, particularly design patent law, and partly because of the 
lesser likelihood that a product configuration would, in the course of 
things, be treated by consumers as an identifier of source.150 
E. Twenty-First Century Cases 
The most recent Supreme Court cases continue the pattern of 
refinement of the abstraction that constitutes the subject matter of each 
field according to the bounds largely identified by statute, precedent, 
and related public policy. Any sense that these abstractions relate to 
underlying philosophical, social, and political interests in knowledge—a 
sense that may help the Court apprehend the implications and overlaps 
among intellectual property disciplines—has mostly, though not 
completely, disappeared. 
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc. addressed the impact of 
patenting on the availability of trade dress protection for design features 
previously disclosed in a utility patent.151 The Court concluded that the 
bar to trade dress protection was not absolute, but it held: “Where the 
expired patent claimed the features in question, one who seeks to 
establish trade dress protection must carry the heavy burden of showing 
that the feature is not functional, for instance by showing that it is merely 
an ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary aspect of the device.”152 The Court 
did not, and perhaps could not, resolve the rhetorical and conceptual 
inconsistency between the idea of the claims and limitations of a patent, 
which define its scope, and the specification of the source-signifying 
features alleged to exist in a particular form of product configuration 
claimed as trade dress. 
Eldred v. Ashcroft found that congressional power to set and extend 
the “limited” term of statutory copyrights was limited, if at all, by the 
concept that congressional authority extends to what the Court called the 
“traditional contours of copyright protection.”153 The Court’s analysis was 
“inform[ed]” by the historical practice of Congress with respect to patent 
policy,154 but the Court also noted clearly that the structure of patent law, 
 
149 529 U.S. 205, 207 (2000). 
150 Id. at 212–14. 
151 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001). 
152 Id. at 30. 
153 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003). 
154 Id. at 201–04. 
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and the quid pro quo bargain that metaphorically cabins each issued 
patent, does not similarly define copyright.155 
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. involved the 
interpretation of a specific subsection of the Lanham Act in the context 
of a film that had once been the subject of copyright protection, but is 
now in the public domain.156 Had the new distributor of the film falsely 
represented the “origin” of the film when it labeled the film and package 
with its own name rather than the name of the copyright owner?157 The 
Court held that liability for a false designation of origin could not attach, 
because “origin” in its statutory context referred to the physical object 
rather than to the expressive context.158 The Court reasoned that such a 
rule would not only protect consumer expectations regarding goods but 
would also preserve copyright and trademark as separate legal and 
commercial domains; it would, the Court said, prevent the emergence of 
a form of “mutant copyright” that would limit the public’s right to copy 
material in the public domain.159 
A handful of more recent cases suggest some interest at the Court in 
moving away from a highly specialized, internal perspective on each 
intellectual property domain and toward a sense that intellectual 
property fields are subject to some of the same pressures and 
opportunities as social activity generally. That trend is still inchoate; it is 
too new to comprise a tendency to look at intellectual property law in 
more integrative terms. In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster,160 
the Court held that secondary liability in copyright could be imposed 
according to general standards applicable to tort cases, including the 
idea of intentional inducement of a tort, rather than according to the 
copyright-specific framework announced in Sony.161 In eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., the Court ruled that the availability of final 
equitable relief under the Patent Act should be governed by the same 
general standards as equitable relief in other civil litigation.162 In KSR v. 
Teleflex,163 the Court refined its understanding of the PHOSITA, as 
specified in Graham, such that in an appropriate case the knowledge of 
the skilled artisan might be informed by the judgment of the field as well 
as by specific teachings of identified pieces of prior art.164 “A person of 
ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”165 
 
155 Id. at 217 n.22. 
156 539 U.S. 23, 25–26 (2003). 
157 Id. at 31. 
158 Id. at 38. 
159 Id. at 34. 
160 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
161 Id. at 936–37. 
162 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
163 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
164 Id. at 415–18. 
165 Id. at 421. 
Do Not Delete 2/17/2011  6:47 PM 
102 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:1 
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. endorsed a broad reading of 
the patent exhaustion principle, limiting an inventor’s exclusive rights in 
patent as applied to a particular item embodying the invention after that 
item has been sold.166 The Court held that exhaustion is applicable to 
method claims as well as to product claims, so long as the relevant 
transaction constituted an authorized sale of a relevant product.167 “The 
authorized sale of an article that substantially embodies a patent exhausts 
the patent holder’s rights and prevents the patent holder from invoking 
patent law to control postsale use of the article.”168 The Court appeared 
to be attempting to align patent law generally with a common-sense 
distinction between patent rights (products of the head) and tangible 
goods (products of the hand). But the opinion is heavily invested in the 
Court’s own precedents having to do with restrictive notices and licenses 
applied to patented products, and in the details of the patent-related 
transactions among the parties in the case.169 There is no fair way to read 
Quanta as engaging explicitly in an analysis of the law of knowledge. 
IV. AUTHORSHIP AND INVENTION IN BILSKI 
In the interest of space, I have not catalogued all intellectual 
property cases from the Supreme Court. The trends that I describe as 
moving toward further and further specialization of each domain of 
intellectual property law are imperfect and incomplete. The divorce of 
artisanal applications of knowledge from artistic ones, of elite 
interpretations of knowledge from vernacular ones, of state-based forms 
and sanctions for knowledge from society-based forms and sanctions, and 
of knowledge-related considerations in any intellectual property 
jurisprudence at this level is ongoing, even if the Court’s most recent 
opinions suggest some evidence of a reversal. On the whole, patent law 
has come to be seen in the Court’s precedents as elite, artisanal, and 
state-sanctioned—to the extent that it continues to be informed at all by 
its relationship with knowledge as I described it earlier. In what remains 
of the relationship between knowledge and copyright, that body of law 
has come to be seen as vernacular, artistic, and social. Trademark law has 
come to be seen as vernacular, artisanal, and simultaneously state-
sanctioned and social. But trademark law is now almost exclusively a 
matter of commerce, divorced from knowledge. 
Where does Bilski v. Kappos fit in this account? The question in that 
case was whether a “business method” constituted a potentially 
patentable “process” within the meaning of that term in section 101 of 
the Patent Act.170 The Court held that the method in question did not. It 
 
166 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2122 (2008). 
167 Id. at 2117. 
168 Id. at 2122. 
169 See id. at 2115–17. 
170 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225, 3228 (2010). 
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was abstract and therefore failed the traditional standard that abstract 
ideas cannot be patented.171 The Federal Circuit had concluded that a 
patentable process had to meet the “machine or transformation” test: A 
process could be patented “if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or 
apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or 
thing.”172 The Supreme Court rejected that standard as the sole test of 
patentability under section 101. The Court wrote: 
 This Court’s precedents establish that the machine-or-
transformation test is a useful and important clue, an investigative 
tool, for determining whether some claimed inventions are 
processes under § 101. The machine-or-transformation test is not 
the sole test for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible 
“process.”173 
The outcome is decidedly inconclusive. Patent practitioners likely 
will take little of real value from the case, and the question of patentable 
subject matter will remain unresolved. 
If patent law has come to be seen as elite, artisanal, and state-
sanctioned, then Bilski neither follows that pattern nor rejects it. The 
fairest judgment may be that Bilski, like much of the Court’s twentieth 
century intellectual property jurisprudence, takes essentially no position 
on the relationship between patent law and questions of knowledge in 
society. The opinion hedges its bets on whether its analytic perspective is 
elite or vernacular. Is the Court’s subject matter perspective informed 
primarily by the technical and technologically determined rules and 
practices of patenting, measured by skilled artisanship, or is it based on 
popular understanding? Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court decrees 
that the statutory term “process” should be interpreted according to its 
“ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.”174 Yet it offers suggestions 
that specialized (expert) meanings might apply, based on the Court’s 
discussions of traditional exclusions from patentable subject matter.175 
Vernacular meanings seem to govern the knowledge governed by patent 
law, the Court seems to say, except when expert meanings apply. Does 
the Court rely on a mostly artisanal approach to the knowledge taught by 
business methods? The conclusion that Bilski’s method failed the section 
101 threshold can be justified on the ground that the method involved 
more head than hand, in metaphorical terms, but the Court’s refusal to 
reject business method claims as a class suggests that it is willing to accept 
patenting of some more “artistic,” that is, conceptual but human-made 
processes. The Court even equivocated with respect to patent law’s state-
sanctioned basis: 
 
171 Id. at 3229–30. 
172 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
173 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227. 
174 Id. at 3226 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981)). 
175 See id. 
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[The Information Age] puts the possibility of innovation in the 
hands of more people and raises new difficulties for the patent law. 
With ever more people trying to innovate and thus seeking patent 
protections for their inventions, the patent law faces a great 
challenge in striking the balance between protecting inventors and 
not granting monopolies over procedures that others would 
discover by independent, creative application of general principles. 
Nothing in this opinion should be read to take a position on where 
that balance ought to be struck.176  
The Court seems to be hinting that the patent system needs to take more 
explicit account of the full range of innovative processes and practices 
and other forms of knowledge that exist in society today. But the Court 
also does not wish to take a position as to which “useful arts” should be 
granted state sanction via the Patent Office. It is difficult to make too 
much of this passage. The concurrence by Justice Stevens is not helpful, 
either. The concurrence traces the contemporary term “process” through 
the Patent Act to the Constitutional phrase “useful arts,” then finds what 
we call “business methods” in current jargon missing from the scope of 
that historical term and related patent practice.177 That approach has a 
vaguely artisanal air, which Justice Stevens then disclaims; in his 
description of relevant public policy, the idea of patents as instruments of 
knowledge is almost entirely absent.178 The fact that the concurrence 
attracted the votes of four Justices lays to rest the possibility that the 
Court has any consistent view of broader knowledge themes.179 
V. CONCLUSION: A LAW OF KNOWLEDGE, IN WORD AND DEED 
I suggested in the Introduction that the Supreme Court has painted 
itself into a doctrinal corner with respect to subject matter questions in 
intellectual property law. I meant that long ago the conceptual 
antecedents of patent, copyright, and trademark law shared an interest in 
big questions having to do with the role of knowledge in society. 
Hundreds of years of doctrinal refinement have largely squeezed those 
questions out of the law, and the remaining landscape of policy and 
precedent does not offer a set of tools that is rich enough to enable the 
Court—or lawyers, legislators, or policymakers working with the same 
questions—to offer a persuasive analysis of contemporary subject matter 
 
176 Id. at 3228. 
177 Id. at 3245–48 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
178 See id. at 3252–57 (Stevens, J., concurring); but see id. at 3254–55 (noting in 
passing that patents on business methods do not encourage the disclosure of 
anything that the “public”—a term that is not further specified—does not already 
“know[]”). In light of the discussion of history and knowledge in Part II, one might 
read the concurrence as suggesting that business methods are not forms of useful 
knowledge because they are forms of useful knowledge. Either the meaning of the 
concurrence is so obscure that it defies interpretation, or it has set out a standard that 
would invalidate a vast range of modern patents on subject matter grounds.  
179 Id. at 3231. 
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problems. If all we had to worry about were books and machines, this 
would not be worrisome. But of course we have to worry about much 
more. 
I also suggested in the Introduction that radically rethinking the 
problem might be called for. I meant that the original questions and 
themes that lawyers and courts encountered in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, having to do with changing forms of knowledge 
and how those forms intersect with changing social, political, and 
philosophical interests, may still be relevant today, but how we go about 
answering those questions and addressing those themes may be quite 
different. I also meant that a similarly thematic approach may be needed 
today, even if the themes that emerge from examination of knowledge 
problems in general—rather than as subdivided ex ante into patent, 
copyright, and trademark problems—might be quite different. Today’s 
contingent patterns may turn out to be quite different than the 
contingent patterns of old England. 
In a recent paper, I suggested that a similarly ambitious effort might 
be appropriate with respect to knowledge interests in copyright law.180 
Taking social interests in knowledge as the normative baseline for all 
aspects of intellectual property law, I offered a broad range of questions 
applicable to any knowledge law regime, covering such broad subjects as 
the language of knowledge law, the objects of knowledge law, roles and 
rules for control and sharing in knowledge law, institutional and material 
contexts for knowledge law, and distinction and integration of 
independent knowledge law traditions, including patent and copyright.181 
All of those questions remain largely unexplored in the context of 
twenty-first century social, economic, political, and economic conditions. 
Bilski, for example, uses a literal and conceptual vocabulary derived from 
late twentieth century caselaw. A more sensible modern reading of all of 
intellectual property law as knowledge law would bring a broad array of 
benefits to the legal system and all those who are affected by it and deal 
with it: avoiding doctrinal inconsistency and ambiguity; offering clarity to 
commercial actors; reducing waste associated with the oversupply of 
intellectual property rights; and, most of all, generating meaningful 
social progress of the sort that both the Constitution and our English 
ancestors anticipated from granting exclusive rights to products of the 
mind. 
It is plausible, perhaps even inevitable, that the legal system should 
want to know what the “thing” is that it is dealing with, whether in a 
property-bound world, a world of commercial regulation of knowledge, 
both, or some other. It is inevitable that the legal system describes and 
builds these things as much as it finds them, and perhaps more so. But 
there is nothing essential or necessary about dividing the world into 
 
180 Michael J. Madison, Beyond Creativity: Copyright as Knowledge Law, 12 VAND. J. 
ENT. & TECH. L. 817 (2010). 
181 See id. at 833–35. 
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“patentable things” rather than “copyrightable things” or “trademarked 
things” any more than there is anything essential or necessary about 
dividing a patentable “invention” from a particular embodiment or a 
copyrightable work of authorship from its fixation in a tangible medium 
of expression.182 These lines are conveniences that suit particular times 
and places, and they should be discarded or at least limited, if time and 
circumstance warrant. The neologism “intellectual property” captures an 
important commonality—not the arguably property-like character of 
each of these things, but the now-accepted notion that they share an 
inescapably imaginative character. Inventions, works, and marks are 
related products of the “labor of the head,” and with that phrase I mean 
to capture not only the efforts and ingenuity of inventors and creators, 
but also the reactions and re-combinations that inhabit the minds of 
audiences and downstream generations. Even the most abstract physical 
laws are products of particular times, places, communities, and impacts. 
That fact does not deprive them of their status as physical laws. It merely 
reinforces the proposition that all knowledge is social.  
To decide what the law has to do with knowledge is to accept the 
relevance of some social contexts and to reject others. What is “the 
invention,” either during prosecution of a patent application or during a 
patent infringement lawsuit? Every patent lawyer knows that claims can 
and will be drafted, where possible, to capture potential infringers; every 
trial lawyer will argue for a construction of the claims of the patent that 
embraces what the defendant has done. The real question in either case 
is not whether the words used in the patent and the things described by 
the patent are congruent, even if that is what the doctrine requires; the 
real question is whether an accused infringer has unfairly appropriated a 
form of knowledge that is fairly associated with the patentee and with the 
patentee’s customers. 
What would the world of intellectual property look like, then, if it 
were more accepting of multiple, intersecting contexts for patent, 
copyright, and trademark (and perhaps other doctrines) as elements of a 
single knowledge law framework, with less emphasis on subject matter 
qualifiers? The question is mostly rhetorical; I am aware of the enormous 
practical impediments to pursuing this question at any level below the 
most conceptual. But even the conceptual conversation may have value. I 
conclude with the following tentative considerations. 
Knowledge law would be less consumed with the specific form of the 
thing that the law needs to address than patent, copyright, and 
trademark law are today. Claim construction in patent law, the doctrine 
of fixation in copyright law, and the distinction between product design 
 
182 Cf. Mark P. McKenna, An Alternate Approach to Channeling?, 51 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 873 (2009) (advocating a shift away from focus on subject matter of each 
intellectual property doctrine in favor of a boundary managing approach grounded 
in intellectual property regimes as complementary or substitute appropriability 
mechanisms). 
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and product packaging (and the functionality doctrine) in trademark law 
are all features of current law that could be re-examined and perhaps 
rendered more flexible. All of these doctrines share an interest in the 
relationship between fixed or tangible form and creative, inventive, or 
distinctive content. 
Liability standards would be reformed to provide greater conceptual 
coherence within each sub-domain of knowledge law and greater 
alignment (though not identity) of standards between sub-domains. 
Patent law currently permits claims for literal infringement and 
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, with different 
conceptual frameworks for structural claims, method or process claims, 
and means-plus-function claims, among other things.183 Claim 
construction is a question for the court; infringement is a question for 
the jury.184 Copyright law and trademark law each have their respective 
tar pits of liability rules, organized around the concept of “substantial 
similarity” in copyright and “likelihood of confusion” in trademark.185 All 
of these doctrines share an interest in the role that identity plays when 
considering the just uses of knowledge. 
Remedies for misuse of knowledge—damages and injunctions for 
infringement—would be reconsidered. In many respects, in light of the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in eBay, revising standards for injunctive relief 
in patent cases, some of this reconsideration is underway.186 Much more 
could be done to rethink the availability of statutory damages in 
copyright but not other intellectual property disciplines, and the 
availability of criminal penalties in copyright and trademark cases but not 
in patent cases. Knowledge law is not a one-size-fits-all concept, but 
remedial similarities and differences among sub-domains could be made 
part of a single overall framework. 
Finally, a body of knowledge law would revive and be informed by 
interest in developing and describing the purposes of the law in more 
detail, beyond vague admonitions that it should be “utilitarian” in 
character. Even my references above to the idea of knowledge as a social 
construct and product are too broad. What I have in mind, however, is 
the restoration in law of an ethics of knowledge. The separation of 
knowledge arguments from intellectual property arguments that I 
describe here, and the resulting elaborate doctrinal introspection, 
correspond largely to the rise of intellectual property interests as tradable 
abstractions. Modern theory treats creations and inventions as public 
goods, subject to flawed private markets. That theory treats copyright and 
patent law as solutions to those flaws, offering incentives to authors and 
inventors that they otherwise would lack. The English pre-history of 
 
183 See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950). 
184 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996). 
185 See Therma-Scan, Inc. v. Thermoscan, Inc., 295 F.3d 623, 629–30 (6th Cir. 
2002); Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 1996). 
186 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
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modern copyright and patent suggests that markets were a consequence 
of notions of rights in knowledge, rather than their cause. Knowledge as 
a source of virtue was the common starting point. Aristotelian philosophy 
suffers from many flaws, but recovering and exploring a kind of 
Aristotelian belief in the association of virtue and knowledge, and 
applying some of that belief to modern intellectual property law, may 
offer some Copernican clarity to a body of law that now suffers from 
Ptolemaic complexity. 
